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Abstract
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) is a standard technique in machine learning, where a model is
selected by minimizing a loss function over constraint set. When the training dataset consists of private
information, it is natural to use a differentially private ERM algorithm, and this problem has been the
subject of a long line of work [CM08, KST12, JKT12, ST13a, DJW13, JT14, BST14, Ull14]. A private
ERM algorithm outputs an approximate minimizer of the loss function and its error can be measured
as the difference from the optimal value of the loss function. When the constraint set is arbitrary, the
required error bounds are fairly well understood [BST14]. In this work, we show that the geometric
properties of the constraint set can be used to derive significantly better results. Specifically, we show
that a differentially private version of Mirror Descent leads to error bounds of the form O˜(GC/n) for a
Lipschitz loss function, improving on the O˜(
√
p/n) bounds in [BST14]. Here p is the dimensionality of
the problem, n is the number of data points in the training set, and GC denotes the Gaussian width of the
constraint set that we optimize over. We show similar improvements for strongly convex functions, and
for smooth functions. In addition, we show that when the loss function is Lipschitz with respect to the
`1 norm and C is `1-bounded, a differentially private version of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm gives error
bounds of the form O˜(n−2/3). This captures the important and common case of sparse linear regression
(LASSO), when the data xi satisfies |xi|∞ ≤ 1 and we optimize over the `1 ball. We also show our
algorithm is nearly optimal by proving a matching lower bound for this setting.
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1 Introduction
A common task in supervised learning is to select the model that best fits the data. This is frequently achieved
by selecting a loss function that associates a real-valued loss with each datapoint d and model θ and then
selecting from a class of admissible models, the model θ that minimizes the average loss over all data points
in the training set. This procedure is commonly referred to as Empirical Risk Minimization(ERM).
The availability of large datasets containing sensitive information from individuals has motivated the
study of learning algorithms that guarantee the privacy of individuals contributing to the database. A rigor-
ous and by-now standard privacy guarantee is via the notion of differential privacy. In this work, we study
the design of differentially private algorithms for Empirical Risk Minimization, continuing a long line of
work initiated by [CM08] and continued in [CMS11, KST12, JKT12, ST13a, DJW13, JT14, BST14, Ull14].
As an example, suppose that the training dataset D consists of n pairs of data di = (xi, yi) where
xi ∈ <p, usually called the feature vector, and yi ∈ <, the prediction. The goal is to find a “reasonable
model” θ ∈ <p such that yi can be predicted from the model θ and the feature vector xi. The quality of
approximation is usually measured by a loss functionL(θ; di), and the empirical loss is defined asL(θ;D) =
1
n
∑
i L(θ; di). For example, in the linear model with squared loss, L(θ; di) = (〈θ, xi〉 − yi)2. Commonly,
one restricts θ to come from a constraint set C. This can account for additional knowledge about θ, or can be
helpful in avoiding overfitting and making the learning algorithm more stable. This leads to the constrained
optimization problem of computing θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ;D). For example, in the classical sparse linear
regression problem, we set C to be the `1 ball. Now our goal is to compute a model θ that is private with
respect to changes in a single di while having high quality, where the quality is measured by the excess
empirical risk compared to the optimal model.
Problem definition: Given a data set D = {d1, · · · , dn} of n samples from a domain D, a convex set
C ⊆ <p, and a convex loss function L : C × D → <, for any model θ, define its excess empirical risk as
R(θ;D)
def
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(θ; di)−min
θ∈C
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(θ; di). (1)
We define the risk of a mechanismA on a data set D as R(A;D) = E[R(A(D);D)], where the expectation
is over the internal randomness of A, and the risk R(A) = maxD∈Dn R(A;D) is the maximum risk over
all the possible data sets. Our objective is then to design a mechanism A which preserves (, δ)-differential
privacy (Definition 2.1) and achieves as low risk as possible. We call the minimum achievable risk as privacy
risk, defined as minAR(A), where the min is over all (, δ)-differentially private mechanisms A.
Previous work on private ERM has studied this problem under fairly general conditions. For convex
loss functions L(θ; di) that for every di are 1-Lipschitz as functions from (<p, `2) to < (i.e. are Lipschitz in
the first parameter with respect to the `2 norm), and for C contained in the unit `2 ball, [BST14] showed1
that the privacy risk is at most O˜(
√
p/n). They also showed that this bound cannot be improved in general,
even for the squared loss function. Similarly they gave tight bounds under stronger assumptions on the loss
functions (more details below).
In this work, we go beyond these worst-case bounds by exploiting properties of the constraint set C. In
the setting of the previous paragraph, we show that the
√
p term in the privacy risk can be replaced by the
Gaussian Width of C, defined as GC = Eg∈N (0,1)p [sup
θ∈C
〈θ, g〉]. Gaussian width is a well-studied quantity in
Convex Geometry that captures the global geometry of C [Bal97]. For a C contained in the the `2 ball it is
never larger than O(
√
p) and can be significantly smaller. For example, for the `1 ball, the Gaussian width
is only Θ(
√
log p). Similarly, we give improved bounds for other assumptions on the loss functions. These
bounds are proved by analyzing a noisy version of the mirror descent algorithm [NY83, BT03].
1Throughout the paper, we use O˜, Ω˜ to hide the polynomial factors in 1/, log(1/δ), logn, and log p.
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In the simplest setting, when the loss function L(·, d) is convex, and L2-Lipschitz with respect to the `2
norm on the parameter space, we get the following result. The precise bounds require a potential function
that is tailored to the convex set C. In the following, let ‖C‖2 denote the `2 radius of C, and GC denote the
Gaussian width of C.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal version). There exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm A such that
R(A) = O
(
L2GC log(n/δ)
n
)
.
In particular,R(A) = O
(
L2‖C‖2√p log(n/δ)
n
)
, and if C is a polytope with k vertices,R(A) = O
(
L2‖C‖2 log k log(n/δ)
n
)
.
Similar improvements can be shown (Section 3.2) for other constraint sets, such as those bounding the
grouped `1 norm, interpolation norms, or the nuclear norm when the vector is viewed as a matrix. When
one additionally assumes that the loss functions satisfy a strong convexity definition (Appendix A) , we can
get further improved bounds. Moreover, for smooth loss functions (Section 4), we can show that a simpler
objective perturbation algorithm [CMS11, KST12] gives Gaussian-width dependent bounds similar to the
ones above. Our work also implies Gaussian-width-dependent convergence bounds for the noisy (stochastic)
mirror descent algorithm, which may be of independent interest.
The bounds based on mirror descent have a dependence on the `2 Lipschitz constant. This constant
might be too large for some problems. For example, for the popular sparse linear regression problem, one
often assumes xi to have bounded `∞ norm, i.e. each entry of xi, instead of ‖xi‖2, is bounded. The `2
Lipschitz constant is then polynomial in p and leads to a loose bound. In these cases, it would be more
beneficial to have a dependence on the `1 Lipschitz constant. Our next contribution is to address this issue.
We show that when C is the `1 ball, one can get significantly better bounds using a differentially private
version of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. Let ‖C‖1 denote the maximum `1 radius of C, and ΓL the curvature
constant for L (precise definition in Section 5).
Theorem 1.2. If C is a polytope with k vertices, then there exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm
A such that
R(A) = O
(
ΓL1/3 (L1‖C‖1)2/3 log(nk)
√
log(1/δ)
(n)2/3
)
.
In particular, for the sparse linear regression problem where each ‖xi‖∞ ≤ 1, we have that
R(A) = O(log(np/δ)/(n)2/3) .
Finally, we use the fingerprinting code lower bound technique developed in [BUV14] to show that the
upper bound for the sparse linear regression problem, and hence the above result, is nearly tight.
Theorem 1.3. For the sparse linear regression problem where ‖xi‖∞ ≤ 1, for  = 0.1 and δ = 1/n, any
(, δ)-differentially private algorithm A must have
R(A) = Ω(1/(n log n)2/3) .
In Table 1 we summarize our upper and lower bounds. Combining our results with that of [BST14], in
particular we show that all the bounds in this paper are essentially tight. The lower bound for the `1-norm
case does not follow from [BST14], and we provide a new lower bound argument.
Our results enlarge the set of problems for which privacy comes “for free”. Given n samples from a
distribution, suppose that θ∗ is the empirical risk minimizer and θpriv is the differentially private approximate
minimizer. Then the non-private ERM algorithm outputs θ∗ and incurs expected (on the distribution) loss
2
Previous work This work
Assumption Upper bound Lower bound
Upper bound
Lower bound
1-Lipschitz w.r.t
L2-norm and
‖C‖2 = 1
√
p
n [BST14] Ω
(√
p
n
)
[BST14]
Mirror descent: 1nmin{√p,log k}
... and λ-smooth
√
p+λ
n [CMS11] Ω
(√
p
n
)
[BST14]
(for λ = O(p)) Frank-Wolfe:
λ1/3
(n)2/3
min{p1/3,log1/3 k}
Obj. pert: min{
√
p,
√
log k}+λ
n
1-Lipschitz
w.r.t L1-norm,
‖C‖1 = 1, and
curvature Γ
Frank-Wolfe: Γ
1/3 log(nk)
(n)2/3
Ω˜
(
1
n2/3
)
Table 1: Upper and lower bounds for (, δ)-differentially private ERM. k denotes the number of corners in
the convex set C.(In general the dependence is on the Gaussian width of C, generalizing√p or√log k.) The
curvature parameter is a weaker condition than smoothness, and is in particular bounded by the smoothness.
Bounds ignore multiplicative dependence of log(1/δ) and in the lower bounds,  is considered as a constant.
The lower bounds of [BST14] have the form Ω(min{n, · · · }).
equal to the loss(θ∗, training-set)+generalization-error, where the generalization error term depends on the
loss function, C and on the number of samples n. The differentially private algorithm incurs an additional
loss of the privacy risk. If the privacy risk is asymptotically no larger than the generalization error, we
can think of privacy as coming for free, since under the assumption of n being large enough to make the
generalization error small, we are also making n large enough to make the privacy risk small. For many of
the problems, by our work we get privacy risk bounds that are close to the best known generalization bounds
for those settings. More concretely, in the case when the ‖C‖2 ≤ 1 and the loss function is 1-Lipschitz in
the `2-norm, the known generalization error bounds strictly dominate the privacy risk when n = ω(G4C)
[SSSSS09, Theorem 7]. In the case when C is the `1-ball, and the loss function is the squared loss with
‖x‖∞ ≤ 1 and |y| ≤ 1, the generalization error dominates the privacy risk when n = ω(log3 p) [BM03,
Theorem 18].
1.1 Related work
In the following we distinguish between the two settings: i) the convex set is bounded in the `2-norm and the
the loss function is 1-Lipschitz in the `2-norm (call it the (`2/`2)-setting for brevity), and ii) the convex set is
bounded in the `1-norm and the the loss function is 1-Lipschitz in the `1-norm (call it the (`1/`∞)-setting).
The (`2/`2)-setting: In all the works on private convex optimization that we are aware of, either the excess
risk guarantees depend polynomially on the dimensionality of the problem (p), or assumes special structure
to the loss (e.g., generalized linear model [JT14] or linear losses [DNPR10, ST13b]). Similar dependence is
also present in the online version of the problem [JKT12, ST13c]. [BST14] recently show that in the private
ERM setting, in general this polynomial dependence on p is unavoidable. In our work we show that one can
replace this dependence on p with the Gaussian width of the constraint set C, which can be much smaller.
We use the mirror descent algorithm of [BT03] as our building block.
The (`1/`∞)-setting: The only results in this setting that we are aware of are [KST12, ST13a, JT14, ST13b].
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The first two works make certain assumtions about the instance (restricted strong convexity (RSC) and mu-
tual incoherence). Under these assumptions, they obtain privacy risk guarantees that depend logarithmically
in the dimensions p, and thus allowing the guarantees to be meaningful even when p  n. In fact their
bound of O(polylog p/n) can be better than our tight bound of O(polylog p/n2/3). However, these assump-
tions on the data are strong and may not hold in practice [Was12]. Our guarantees do not require any such
data dependent assumptions. The result of [JT14] captures the scenario when the constraint set C is the
probability simplex and the loss function is in the generalized linear model, but provides a worse bound of
O(polylog p/n1/3).
Effect of Gaussian width in risk minimization: For linear losses, the notions of Rademacher complexities
and Gaussian complexities are closely related to the concept of Gaussian width, i.e., when the loss function
are of the form 〈θ, d〉. One of the initial works that formalized this connection was by [BM03]. They in
particular bound the excess generalization error by the Gaussian complexity of the constraint set C, which
is very similar to Gaussian width in the context of linear functions. Recently [CRPW12] show that the
Gaussian width of a constraint set C is very closely related to the number of generic linear measurements
one needs to perform to recover an underlying model θ∗ ∈ C.
[SZ13] analyzed the problem of noisy stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for general convex loss func-
tions. Their empirical risk guarantees depend polynomially on the `2-norm of the noise vector that gets
added during the gradient computation in the SGD algorithm. As a corollary of our results we show that if
the noise vector is sub-Gaussian (not necessarily spherical), the polynomial dependence on the `2-norm of
the noise can be replaced by a term depending on the Gaussian width of the set C.
Analysis of noisy descent methods: The analysis of noisy versions of gradient descent and mirror descent
algorithms has attracted interest for unrelated reasons [RRWN11, DJM13] when asynchronous updates are
the source of noise. To our knowledge, this line of work does not take the geometry of the constraint set into
account, and thus our results may be applicable to those settings as well.
We should note here that the notion of Gaussian width has been used by [NTZ13], and [DNT13] in the
context of differentially private query release mechanisms but in the very different context of answering
multiple linear queries over a database.
2 Background
2.1 Differential Privacy
The notion of differential privacy (Definition 2.1) is by now a defacto standard for statistical data privacy
[DMNS06, Dwo06, Dwo08, Dwo09]. One of the reasons for which differential privacy has become so
popular is because it provides meaningful guarantees even in the presence of arbitrary auxiliary information.
At a semantic level, the privacy guarantee ensures that an adversary learns almost the same thing about an
individual independent of his presence or absence in the data set. The parameters (, δ) quantify the amount
of information leakage. For reasons beyond the scope of this work,  ≈ 0.1 and δ = 1/nω(1) are a good
choice of parameters. Here n refers to the number of samples in the data set.
Definition 2.1. A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private ([DMNS06, DKM+06]) if, for all
neighboring data sets D and D′ (i.e., they differ in one record, or equivalently, dH(D,D′) = 1) and for all
events S in the output space of A, we have
Pr(A(D) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(A(D′) ∈ S) + δ .
Here dH(D,D′) refers to the Hamming distance.
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2.2 Bregman Divergence, Convexity, Norms, and Gaussian Width
In this section we review some of the concepts commonly used in convex optimization useful to the exposi-
tion of our algorithms. In all the definitions below we assume that the set C ⊆ <p is closed and convex.
`q-norm, q ≥ 1: For q ≥ 1, the `q-norm for any vector v ∈ <p is defined as
(
p∑
i=1
v(i)q
)1/q
, where v(i) is
the i-th coordinate of the vector v.
Minkowski norm w.r.t a set C ⊆ <p: For any vector v ∈ <p, the Minkowski norm (denoted by ‖v‖C) w.r.t.
a centrally symmetric convex set C is defined as follows.
‖v‖C = min{r ∈ < : v ∈ rC}.
L-Lipschitz continuity w.r.t. norm ‖ · ‖: A function Ψ : C → < is L-Lispchitz within a set C w.r.t. a norm
‖ · ‖ if the following holds.
∀θ1, θ2 ∈ C, |Ψ(θ1)−Ψ(θ2)| ≤ L · ‖θ1 − θ2‖.
Convexity and ∆-strong convexity w.r.t norm ‖ · ‖: A function Ψ : C → < is convex if
∀θ1, θ2 ∈ C, α ∈ [0, 1],Ψ(αθ1 + (1− α)θ2) ≤ αΨ(θ1) + (1− α)Ψ(θ2).
A function is ∆-strongly convex within a set C w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖ if
∀θ1, θ2 ∈ C, α ∈ [0, 1],Ψ(αθ1 + (1− α)θ2) ≤ αΨ(θ1) + (1− α)Ψ(θ2)− ∆ · α(1− α)
2
‖θ1 − θ2‖2.
Bregman divergence: For any convex function Ψ : <p → <, the Bregman divergence defined by BΨ :
<p ×<p → < is defined as
BΨ(θ1, θ2) = Ψ(θ1)−Ψ(θ2)− 〈5Ψ(θ2), θ1 − θ2〉.
Notice that Bregman divergence is always positive, and convex in the first argument.
∆-strong convexity w.r.t a function Ψ: A function f : C → < is ∆-strongly convex within a set C w.r.t. a
differentiable convex function Ψ if the following holds.
∀θ1, θ2 ∈ C, α ∈ [0, 1], f(αθ1 + (1− α)θ2) ≤ αf(θ1) + (1− α)f(θ2)− ∆ · α(1− α)
2
BΨ(θ1, θ2).
Duality: The following duality property (Fact 2.2) of norms will be useful through the rest of this paper.
Recall that for any pair of dual norms ‖ · ‖a and ‖ · ‖b, and x, y ∈ <p, Holder’s inequality says that
|〈x, y〉| ≤ ‖x‖a · ‖y‖b.
Fact 2.2. The dual of `q norm is `q′-norm such that 1/q + 1/q′ = 1. The dual of ‖ · ‖C is ‖ · ‖C∗ , where for
any vector v ∈ <p, ‖v‖C∗ = max
w∈C
|〈w, v〉| .
Gaussian width of a set C: Let b ∼ N (0, Ip) be a Gaussian random vector in <p. The Gaussian width of a
set C is defined as GC def= Eb
[
sup
w∈C
〈b, w〉
]
.
Fact 2.3 (Concentration of Gaussian width [BLM13]). Let W = sup
w∈C
〈b, w〉, where b ∼ N (0, 1)p and
α2 = max
θ∈C
‖θ‖22. Then,
Pr [|W −GC | ≥ u] ≤ 2e−
u2
2α2 .
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3 Private Mirror Descent and the Geometry of C
In this section we introduce the well-established mirror descent algorithm [NY83] in the context of private
convex optimization. We notice that since mirror descent is designed to closely follow the geometry of the
convex set C, we get much tighter bounds than that were known earlier in the literature for a large class of
interesting instantiations of the convex set C. More precisely, using private mirror descent one can show
that the privacy depends on the Gaussian width (see Section 2.2) instead of any explicit dependence on the
dimensionality p. The main technical contribution in the analysis of private (noisy) mirror descent is to
express the expected potential drop in terms of the Gaussian width.(See (4) in the proof of Theorem 3.2.)
3.1 Private Mirror Descent Method
In Algorithm 1 we define our private mirror descent procedure. The algorithm takes as input a potential
function Ψ that is chosen based on the constraint set C. BΨ refers to the Bregman divergence with respect to
Ψ. (See Section 2.2.) If L(θ; d) is not differentiable at θ, we use any sub-gradient at θ instead of5L(θ; d).
Algorithm 1 ANoise−MD: Differentially Private Mirror Descent
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, loss function: L(θ;D) = 1n
n∑
i=1
L(θ; di) (with `2-Lipschitz constant
L for L), privacy parameters: (, δ), convex set: C, potential function: Ψ : C → <, and learning rate:
η : [T + 1]→ <.
1: Set noise variance σ2 ← 32L2T log2(T/δ)
(n)2
.
2: Let θ1 : be an arbitrary point in C.
3: for t = 1 to T do
4: θt+1 = arg min
θ∈C
〈ηt+1 5 (L(θt;D) + bt −Ψ(θt)), θ − θt〉+ Ψ(θ), where bt ∼ N (0, Ipσ2).
5: Output θpriv ← 1T
T∑
t=1
θt.
Theorem 3.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private.
The proof of this theorem is fairly straightforward and follows from by now standard privacy guarantee
of Gaussian mechanism [DKM+06], and the strong composition theorem [DRV10]. For a detailed proof,
we refer the reader to [BST14, Theorem 2.1]. To establish the utility guarantee in a general form, it will be
useful to introduce a symmetric convex body Q (and the norm ‖ · ‖Q) w.r.t. which the potential function
Ψ is strongly convex. We will instantiate this theorem with various choices of Q and Ψ depending on C
in Section 3.2. While relatively standard in Mirror Descent algorithms, the reader may find it somewhat
counter-intuitive that Q enters the algorithm only through the potential function Ψ, but plays an important
role the analysis and the resulting guarantee. In most of the cases, we will set Q = C and the reader may
find it convenient to think of that case. Our proof of the theorem below closely follows the analysis of mirror
descent from [ST10].
One can obtain stronger guarantees (typically, O˜(1/(n)2)) under strong convexity assumptions on the
loss function. We defer the details of this result to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2 (Utility guarantee). Suppose that for any d ∈ D, the loss function L(·; d) is convex and L-
lipschitz with respect to the `2 norm. Let Q ⊆ <p be a symmetric convex set with Gaussian width GQ
and `2-diameter ‖Q‖2, and let Ψ : C → < be 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q-norm chosen in Algorithm
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ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1). If T = ‖Q‖
2
2
2n2
L2 log2(n/δ)(G2Q+‖Q‖22)
and for all t ∈ [T + 1], ηt = η = 1L‖Q‖2√T , then
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
L
√(
G2Q + ‖Q‖22
)
max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ) log(n/δ)
n
 .
Remark 1. Notice that the bound above is scale invariant. For example, given an initial choice of the convex
set Q, scaling Q may reduce GQ but at the same time it will scale up the strong convexity parameter.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. For the ease of notation we ignore the parameterization of L(θ;D) on the data set
D and simply refer to as L(θ). To begin with, from a direct application of Jensen’s inequality, we have the
following.
L(θpriv)−min
θ∈C
L(θ) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
L (θt)−min
θ∈C
L(θ) (2)
So it suffices to bound the R.H.S. of (2) in order to bound the excess empirical risk. In Claim 3.3,
we upper bound the R.H.S. of (2) by a sequence of linear approximations of L(θ), thus “linearizing” our
analysis.
Claim 3.3. Let θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ). For every t ∈ [T ], let γt be the sub-gradient of L(θt) used in iteration t
of Algorithm ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1). Then the convexity of the loss function implies that
1
T
T∑
t=1
L (θt)−min
θ∈C
L(θ) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈γt, θt − θ∗〉.
Thus it suffices to bound 1T
T∑
t=1
〈γt, θt − θ∗〉 in order to bound the privacy risk. By simple algebraic
manipulation we have the following. (Recall that bt is the noise vector used in Algorithm ANoise−MD.)
η〈γt + bt, θt − θ∗〉 = η〈γt + bt, θt − θt+1 + θt+1 − θ∗〉
= η〈γt + bt, θt − θt+1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ 〈η(γt + bt) +5Ψ(θt+1)−5Ψ(θt), θt+1 − θ∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+ 〈5Ψ(θt)−5Ψ(θt+1), θt+1 − θ∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
. (3)
We next upper bound each of the terms A, B and C in (3). By Holder’s inequality, we write
A = η〈γt, θt − θt+1〉+ η〈bt, θt − θt+1〉
≤
(
1√
2
‖θt − θt+1‖Q
)
·
(
η
√
2‖γt‖Q∗
)
+
(
1√
2
‖θt − θt+1‖Q
)
·
(
η
√
2‖bt‖Q∗
)
≤ 1
4
‖θt − θt+1‖2Q + η2‖γt‖2Q∗ +
1
4
‖θt − θt+1‖2Q + η2‖bt‖2Q∗
=
1
2
‖θt − θt+1‖2Q + η2
(‖γt‖2Q∗ + ‖bt‖2Q∗)
(4)
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where we have used the A.M-G.M. inequality in the third step. Taking expectations over the choice of bt,
we have
Ebt [A] ≤
1
2
Ebt
[‖θt − θt+1‖2Q]+ η2 (L2‖Q‖22 + Ebt [‖bt‖2Q∗]) . (5)
We now bound Ebt
[‖bt‖2Q∗]. First notice that ‖bt‖2Q∗ = σ2(max
θ∈Q
〈θ, v〉
)2
, where v ∼ N (0, 1)p. Let us
denote W =
(
max
θ∈Q
〈θ, v〉
)2
. By Fact 2.3, we have the following for any µ ≥ 0.
Pr
[
W ≥ (µ+ 1)2G2Q
] ≤ 2e− µ2G2Q2‖Q‖22 . (6)
From (6) we have the following.
E [W ] =
∞∫
0
Pr[W ≥ x]dx =
G2Q∫
0
Pr [W ≥ x] dx+
∞∫
G2Q
Pr [W ≥ x] dx
≤ G2Q + 2
∞∫
G2Q
exp
(
−
(
x−G2Q
)
2‖Q‖22
)
dx
= G2Q + 2
∞∫
0
exp
(
− x
2‖Q‖22
)
dx = O
(
G2Q + ‖Q‖22
)
. (7)
Using (5) and (7) we have the following:
Ebt [A] ≤
1
2
Ebt
[‖θt − θt+1‖2Q]+ η2O (L2‖Q‖22 + σ2 (G2Q + ‖Q‖22)) . (8)
We next proceed to bound the term B in (3). By the definition of θt+1, it follows that
〈η(γt + bt)−5Ψ(θt), θt+1〉+ Ψ(θt+1) ≤ 〈η(γt + bt)−5Ψ(θt), θ∗〉+ Ψ(θ∗).
This implies that
B ≤ −Ψ(θt+1) + Ψ(θ∗) + 〈5Ψ(θt+1), θt+1 − θ∗〉
= −BΨ(θt+1, θ∗) ≤ 0. (9)
One can write the term C in (3) as follows.
BΨ(θ∗, θt)− BΨ(θ∗, θt+1)− BΨ(θt+1, θt) = Ψ(θ∗)−Ψ(θt)− 〈5Ψ(θt), θ∗ − θt〉
−Ψ(θ∗) + Ψ(θt+1) + 〈5Ψ(θt+1), θ∗ − θt+1〉
−Ψ(θt+1) + Ψ(θt) + 〈5Ψ(θt), θt+1 − θt〉 = C (10)
Notice that since bt is independent of θt,E[〈bt, θt − θ∗〉] = 0. Plugging the bounds (8),(9) and (10) in (3),
we have the following.
ηE [〈γt, θt − θ∗〉] = ηE [〈γt + bt, θt − θ∗〉]
≤ BΨ(θ∗, θt)− BΨ(θ∗, θt+1) + η2O
(
L2‖Q‖22 + σ2
(
G2Q + ‖Q‖22
))
+
1
2
‖θt − θt+1‖2Q − BΨ(θt+1, θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
(11)
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In order to bound the term D in (11), we use the assumption that Ψ(θ) is 1-strongly convex with respect to
‖ ·‖Q. This immediately implies that in (11)D ≤ 0. Using this bound, summing over all T -rounds, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
E [〈γt, θt − θ∗〉] ≤
max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ)
ηT
+ ηO
(
L2‖Q‖22 + σ2
(
G2Q + ‖Q‖22
))
(12)
In the above we used the following property of Bregman divergence: BΨ(θ∗, θ1) ≤ max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ). We can
prove this fact as follows. Let θ† = argmin
θ∈C
Ψ(θ). By the generalized Pythagorean theorem [Rak09, Chapter
2], it follows that BΨ(θ∗, θ1) ≤ BΨ(θ∗, θ†) − BΨ(θ1, θ†) ≤ BΨ(θ∗, θ†). The last inequality follows from
the fact that Bregman diverence is always non-negative. Now since θ† minimizes Ψ and Ψ is convex, it
follows that 〈5Ψ(θ†), θ∗ − θ†〉 ≥ 0. This immediately implies BΨ(θ∗, θ†) ≤ Ψ(θ∗) ≤ max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ).
Setting T = ‖Q‖
2
2
2n2
log2(n/δ)(‖Q‖22+G2Q)
and η =
√
max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ)
L‖Q‖2
√
T
, and using (2) and Claim 3.3 we get the required
bound.
3.2 Instantiation of Private Mirror Descent to Various Settings of C
In this section we discuss some of the instantiations of Theorem 3.2.
For arbitrary convex set C ⊆ <p with L2-diameter ‖C‖2: Let Ψ(θ) = 12‖θ− θ0‖22 (with some fixed θ0 ∈ C)
and we choose the convex setQ to be the unit `2-ball in Theorem 3.2. Immediately, we obtain the following
as a corollary.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
L
√
p‖C‖2 log(n/δ)
n
)
. (13)
This is a slight improvement over [BST14].
For the convex set C ⊆ <p being a polytope: Let C = conv{v1, · · · , vk} be the convex hull of vectors
vi ∈ <p such that for all i ∈ [p], ‖vi‖2 ≤ ‖C‖2. Fact 3.4 will be very useful for choosing the correct
potential function Ψ in Algorithm ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1).
Fact 3.4 (From [SST11]). For the convex set C defined above, let Q be the convex hull of C and −C.
The Minkowski norm for any θ ∈ <p is given by ‖θ‖Q = inf
α1,··· ,αk,
k∑
i=1
αivi=θ
[
k∑
i=1
|αi|
]
. Additionally,
let ‖θ‖Q,q = inf
α1,··· ,αk,
k∑
i=1
αivi=θ
[
k∑
i=1
|αi|q
]1/q
be a norm for any q ∈ (1, 2]. Then the function Ψ(θ) =
1
4(q−1)‖θ‖2Q,q is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q,q-norm.
In the following we state the following claim which will be useful later.
Claim 3.5. If q = log klog k−1 , then the following is true for any θ ∈ <p: ‖θ‖Q ≤ e · ‖θ‖Q,q.
Proof. First notice that for any vector v = 〈v1, · · · , vk〉, ‖v‖1 ≤ k1−1/q‖v‖q. This follows from Holder’s
inequality. Now setting q = log k/(log k−1), we get ‖v‖1 ≤ e·‖v‖q. For any θ ∈ <p, let a = 〈α1, · · · , αk〉
be the vector of parameters corresponding to ‖θ‖Q,q. From the above, we know that ‖a‖1 ≤ e · ‖a‖q. And
by definition, we know that ‖θ‖Q ≤ ‖a‖1. This completes the proof.
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Claim 3.5 implies that if Ψ(θ) = 14(q−1)‖θ‖2Q,q and q = log klog k−1 , then maxθ∈C Ψ(θ) = O(log k). Addi-
tionally due to Fact 3.4, Ψ(θ) is O(1)-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q. With the above observations, and
observing that GQ = O(‖C‖2
√
log k), setting Q and Ψ as above, we immediately get the following corol-
lary of Theorem 3.2. Notice that the bound does not have any explicit dependence on the dimensionality of
the problem.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
L‖C‖2 log k log(n/δ)
n
)
. (14)
Notice that this result extends to the standard p-dimensional probability simplex: C = {θ ∈ <p :
p∑
i=1
θi =
1,∀i ∈ [p], θi ≥ 0}. In this case, the only difference is that the term log k gets replaced by log p in (14).
We remark that applying standard approaches of [JT14, ST13b] provides a similar bound only in the case of
linear loss functions.
For grouped `1-norm: For a vector x ∈ <p and a parameter k, the grouped `1-norm defined as ‖θ‖(k,`1,2) =
dp/ke∑
i=1
√√√√ min{i·k,p}∑
j=(i−1)k+1
|θj |2. If C denotes the convex set centered at zero with radius one with respect to ‖ ·
‖(k,`1,2)-norm, then it follows from union bound on each of the blocks of coordinates in [p] that GC =√
k log(p/k). In the following we propose the following choices of Ψ depending on the parameter k.
(These choices are based on [BTN13, Section 5.3.3].) For a given M > 1, divide the coordinates of θ into
M blocks, and denote each block as θ(j).
Ψ(θ) =
1
Mξ
M∑
j=1
∥∥∥θ(j)∥∥∥M
2
,M =
{
2, if dp/ke ≤ 2
1 + 1/(log(p/k)), otherwise
, ξ =

1, if dp/ke = 1
1/2, if dp/ke = 2
1/(e log(p/k)) otherwise
With this setting of Ψ(θ) one can show that max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ) = O(
√
log(p/k)). Plugging these bounds in Theo-
rem 3.2, we get (15) as a corollary.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
L
√
k log2(p/k) log(n/δ)
n
 . (15)
Similar bounds can be achieved for other forms of interpolation norms, e.g., L1, L2-interpolation norms:
‖θ‖α,inter(`1,`2) = (1−α)‖θ‖1 +α‖θ‖2 with α ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that since the set C = {θ : ‖θ‖α,inter(`1,`2)≤1}
is a subset of C1 + C2, where C1 = {(1 − α)θ : ‖θ‖1 ≤ 1} and C2 = {αθ : ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1}, it follows that the
Gaussian width GC ≤ GC1 +GC2 = O((1− α)
√
log p+ α
√
p). Additionally from [SST11] it follows that
there exists a strongly convex function Ψ(θ) w.r.t. ‖ ·‖C such that it isO(1) for θ ∈ C. While using Theorem
3.2 in both of the above settings, we set the convex set Q = C.
For low-rank matrices: It is known that the non-private mirror descent extends immediately to matrices
[BTN13]. In the following we show that this is also true for the private mirror descent algorithm in Algorithm
1 (ANoise−MD). For the matrix setting, we assume θ ∈ <p×p and the loss function L(θ; d) is L-Lipschitz in
the Frobenius norm ‖ · ‖F . From [DTTZ14] it follows that if the noise vector b in Algorithm ANoise−MD is
replaced by a matrix b ∈ <p×p with each entry of b drawn i.i.d. fromN (0, σ2) (with the standard deviation
σ being the same as in Algorithm ANoise−MD), then the (, δ)-differential privacy guarantee holds. In the
following we instantiate Theorem 3.2 for the class of m×m real matrices with nuclear norm at most one.
Call it the set C. (For a matrix θ, ‖θ‖nuc refers to the sum of the singular values of θ.) This class is the convex
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hull of rank one matrices with unit euclidean norm. [CRPW12, Proposition 3.11] shows that the Gaussian
width of C is O(√m). [BTN13, Section 5.2.3] showed that the function Ψ(θ) = 4
√
e log(2m)
2q(1+q)
m∑
i=1
σ1+qi (θ)
with q = 12 log(2m) is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖nuc-norm. Moreover, maxθ∈C Ψ(θ) = O(logm). Plugging
these bounds in Theorem 3.2 , we immediately get the following excess empirical risk guarantee.
E
[
L(θpriv;D)
]
−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
L
√
m logm log(n/δ)
n
)
. (16)
3.3 Convergence Rate of Noisy Mirror Descent
In this section we analyze the excess empirical risk guarantees of Algorithm 1 (Algorithm ANoise−MD)
as a purely noisy mirror descent algorithm, and ignoring privacy considerations. Let us assume that the
oracle that returns the gradient computation is noisy. In particular each of the bt (in Line 4 of Algorithm
ANoise−MD) is drawn independently from distributions which are mean zero and sub-Gaussian with variance
Σp×p, where Σ is the covariance matrix. For example, this may be achieved by sampling a small number
of di’s and averaging 5L(θt; di) over the sampled values. Using the same proof technique of Theorem
3.2, and the observation that Eb∼N (0,Ip)
[
max
θ∈C
∣∣∣〈√Σ · b, θ〉∣∣∣] = O(√λmax(Σ)GC), we obtain the following
corollary of Theorem 3.2. Here λmax corresponds to the maximum eigenvalue and we set the convex set
Q = C in Theorem 3.2 for the ease of exposition.
Corollary 3.6 (Noisy mirror descent guarantee). Let C ⊆ <p be a symmetric convex set with its `2 diameter
and Gaussian width represented by ‖C‖2 and GC respectively, and let Ψ : C → < be an 1-strongly convex
function w.r.t. ‖ · ‖C-norm chosen in Algorithm ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1). For any d ∈ D, suppose that
the loss function L(θ; d) is convex and L-Lipschitz with respect to the `2 norm. If for all t ∈ [T + 1],
ηt = η =
√
max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ)√
T(L2‖C‖22+λmax(Σ)(G2C+‖C‖22))
, then the following is true.
E
[
L(θalg;D)
]
−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O

√
max
θ∈C
Ψ(θ)
√
T
(
L2‖C‖22 + λmax(Σ)
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
))
√
T
 .
Here the expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.
Corollary 3.6 above improves on the bound obtained in the noisy gradient descent literature [SZ13,
Theorem 2] as long as the noise follows the mean zero sub-Gaussian distribution mentioned above and the
potential function Ψ exists. In particular it improves on the dependence on dimension by removing any
explicit dependence on p. For different settings of Ψ depending on the convex set C, see Section 3.2.
4 Objective Perturbation for Smooth Functions
In this section we show that if the loss function L is twice continuously differentiable, then one can recover
similar bounds as in Section 3 using the objective perturbation algorithm of [CMS11, KST12]. The main
contribution in this section is a tighter analysis of objective perturbation using Gaussian width. In the
following (Algorithm 2) we first revisit the objective perturbation algorithm. The (, δ)-differential privacy
guarantee follows from [KST12]. Theorem 4.1 shows privacy risk bounds that are similar to that in Section
3.
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Remark 2. The smoothness property of the loss function L is used in the privacy analysis. It can be shown
that this is in some sense necessary. (See [KST12] for a more detailed discussion.) Standard approaches
towards smoothing (like convolving with a smooth function) adversely affects the utility guarantee and
results in sub-optimal dependence on the number of data samples (n). (See [BST14, Appendix E].)
Remark 3. We define the set Q as in Theorem 4.1 because we want to both symmetrize and extend the
convex set C to a full-dimensional space. For example, think of the probability simplex in p-dimensions as
the set C, and Q to be the `1-ball. Also when there exists a differentiable convex function Ψ : C → < such
that Ψ is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q and the guarantee in Theorem A.1 holds w.r.t. Ψ, then Theorem
4.1 is a special case of Theorem A.1. This in particular captures the following cases: i) Ψ(θ) = 12‖θ‖22
(and correspondingly Q being the `2-ball), and ii) Ψ(θ) =
p∑
i=1
θi log θi (and correspondingly Q being the
`1-ball).
Algorithm 2 Objective Perturbation [KST12]
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, loss function: L(θ;D) = 1n
n∑
i=1
L(θ; di) (with `2-Lipschitz constant L
for L), privacy parameters: (, δ), convex set: C (denote the diameter in `2-norm by ‖C‖2), upper and
lower bounds λmax, λmin on the eigenvalues of52L(θ; d) (for all d and for all θ ∈ C).
1: Set ζ = max
{
2λmax
n − minθ∈C,d∈D λmin(5
2L(θ; d)), 0
}
.
2: Output θpriv ← arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D)+ ζ2‖θ−θ0‖22+〈b, θ〉, where b ∼ N
(
0, L
2(2 log(1/δ))
(n)2
Ip×p
)
and θ0 ∈ C
is fixed.
Theorem 4.1 (Utility guarantee). Suppose that C ⊆ <p has diameter ‖C‖2 and Gaussian widthGC . Further
suppose that for all d ∈ D, the loss function L(·; d) is twice continuously differentiable, and for all θ ∈ C,
‖ 52 l(θ; d)‖ has spectral norm at most λmax. Then Algorithm 2 satisfies the following guarantees.
1. Lipschitz case: Suppose that for any d ∈ D, the loss function L(·; d) is convex and L-lipschitz w.r.t.
the `2 norm. Then
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
LGC
√
log(1/δ) + λmax‖C‖22
n
)
.
2. Lipschitz and strongly convex case: Suppose that for any d ∈ D, the loss function L(·; d) is L-
lipschitz in the `2 norm, and ∆-strongly convex with respect to ‖ · ‖Q, where Q is the symmetric
convex hull of C. If ∆ ≥ 2‖C‖22λmaxn , then the following is true.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
(LGC)2 log(1/δ)
∆(n)2
)
.
Proof. For the ease of notation, we will drop the dependence on the data set D, and represent the loss
functinon L(θ;D) as L(θ). Let J(θ) = L(θ) + ∆2 ‖θ‖22 and let Jpriv(θ) = J(θ) + 〈b, θ〉. Also let θˆ =
arg min
θ∈C
J(θ). We denote the variance of the noise in Algorithm 2, by σ2 = L
2(2 log(1/δ))
(n)2
.
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Case 1 (Loss function L is Lipschitz): By the optimality of θpriv, the following is true.
Jpriv(θˆ) ≥ Jpriv(θpriv)
⇔ J(θˆ) + 〈b, θˆ〉 ≥ J(θpriv) + 〈b, θpriv〉
⇔ J(θpriv)− J(θˆ) ≤ 〈b, θˆ − θpriv〉
⇒ E
[
J(θpriv)− J(θˆ)
]
= O
(
LGC
√
log(1/δ)
n
)
. (17)
The last equality follows from the definition of Gaussian width and the variance of the noise vector b. Let
θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ). From (17),the definition of J(θ), and that θˆ minimizes J(θ), the following is true.
E
[L(θpriv)− L(θ∗)] = E [J(θpriv)− J(θ∗)]+ ζ
2
‖θ∗ − θ0‖22 −
ζ
2
‖θpriv − θ0‖22
≤ E
[
J(θpriv)− J(θˆ)
]
+
ζ
2
‖θ∗ − θ0‖22
= O
(
LGC
√
log(1/δ) + λmax‖C‖22
n
)
. (18)
Case 2 (Loss function L is Lipschitz and strongly convex): First notice that by the definition of Minkowski
norm, for any vector v ∈ C, ‖v‖Q ≥ ‖v‖2/‖C‖2. This implies that if L is ∆-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q-
norm, then it is ∆/‖C‖22 strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖2-norm. Hence with the lower bound on ∆-satisfied, ζ in
Algorithm 2 is always zero.
By the definition of strong convexity of L, the following is true.
L(θ∗) ≥ L(θpriv) + ∆
2
‖θpriv − θ∗‖2Q
⇔ L(θ∗) + 〈b, θ∗〉 − 〈b, θ∗〉 ≥ L(θpriv) + 〈b, θpriv〉 − 〈b, θpriv〉+ ∆
2
‖θpriv − θ∗‖2Q
⇒ 〈b, θpriv − θ∗〉 ≥ ∆
2
‖θpriv − θ∗‖2Q
⇒ 〈b, θ
priv − θ∗
‖θpriv − θ∗‖Q 〉 ≥
∆
2
‖θpriv − θ∗‖Q
⇒ max
v∈Q
〈b, v〉 ≥ ∆
2
‖θpriv − θ∗‖Q
⇒ ‖θpriv − θ∗‖Q ≤
2 max
v∈Q
〈b, v〉
∆
=
2‖b‖Q∗
∆
(19)
In the above we have used the fact L(θ∗) + 〈b, θ∗〉 ≤ L(θpriv) + 〈b, θpriv〉 (due to the optimality condition).
Using (19) we get the following.
L(θ∗) + 〈b, θ∗〉 ≥ L(θpriv) + 〈b, θpriv〉
⇒ L(θpriv)− L(θ∗) ≤ ‖b‖Q∗ · ‖θpriv − θ∗‖Q
⇒ L(θpriv)− L(θ∗) ≤ 2‖b‖
2
Q∗
∆
⇒ E [L(θpriv)]− L(θ∗) = O(σ2G2Q
∆
)
= O
(
(LGC)2 log(1/δ)
∆(n)2
)
.
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This completes the proof. In the last step we used the fact that GQ = Θ(GC).
5 Private Convex Optimization by Frank-Wolfe algorithm
The algorithms in the previous section work best when the objective function is Lipschitz with respect to `2
norm. But in many machine learning tasks, especially those with sparsity constraint, the objective function
is often Lipschitz with respect to `1 norm. For example, in the high-dimensional linear regression setting e.g.
the classical LASSO algorithm[Tib96], we would like to compute argmin
θ,‖θ‖1≤s
1
n‖Xθ − y‖22. In the usual case
of |xij |, |yj | = O(1), L(θ) = 1n‖Xθ− y‖22 is O(1)-Lipschitz with respect to `1-norm but is O(p)-Lipschitz
with respect to `2-norm. So applying the private mirror-descent would result in a fairly loose bound. In
this section, we will show that in these cases it is more effective to use the private version of the classical
Frank-Wolfe algorithm. In particular, we show that for LASSO, such algorithm achieves the nearly optimal
privacy risk of O˜(1/n2/3).
5.1 Frank-Wolfe algorithm
The Frank-Wolfe algorithm [FW56] can be regarded as a “greedy” algorithm which moves towards the
optimum solution in the first order approximation (see Algorithm 3 for the description). How fast Frank-
Wolfe algorithm converges depends L’s “curvature”, defined as follows according to [Cla10, Jag13]. We
remark that a β-smooth function on C has curvature constant bounded by β‖C‖2.
Definition 5.1 (Curvature constant). For L : C → <, define ΓL as below.
ΓL := sup
θ1,θ2,∈C,γ∈(0,1],θ3=θ1+γ(θ2−θ1)
2
γ2
(L(θ3)− L(θ1)− 〈θ3 − θ1,5L(θ1)〉) .
Remark 4. One can show ([Cla10, Jag13]) that for any q, r ≥ 1 such that q−1 + r−1 = 1, ΓL is upper
bounded by λ‖C‖2q , where λ = max
θ∈C,‖v‖q=1
‖ 52 L(θ) · v‖r.
Remark 5. One useful bound is for the quadratic programming L(θ) = θXTXθ + 〈b, θ〉. In this case,
by [Cla10], ΓL ≤ maxa,b∈X·C ‖a − b‖22. When C is centrally symmetric, we have the bound ΓL ≤
4 maxθ∈C ‖Xθ‖22.
Algorithm 3 Frank-Wolfe algorithm
Input: C ⊆ <p, L : C → <, µ
1: Choose an arbitrary θ1 from C;
2: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
3: Compute θ˜t = argminθ∈C〈5L(θt), (θ − θt)〉;
4: Set θt+1 = θt + µ(θ˜t − θt);
5: return θT .
Define θ∗ = argmin
θ∈C
L(θ). The following theorem shows the convergence of Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
Theorem 5.2 ([Cla10, Jag13]). If we set µ = 1/T , then L(θT )− L(θ∗) = O(ΓL/T ) .
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While the Frank-Wolfe algorithm does not necessarily provide faster convergence compared to the
gradient-descent based method, it has two major advantages. First, on Line 3, it reduces the problem to
solving a minimization of linear function. When C is defined by small number of vertices, e.g. when C is
an `1 ball, the minimization can be done by checking 〈5L(θt), x〉 for each vertex x of C. This can be done
efficiently. Secondly, each step in Frank-Wolfe takes a convex combination of θt and θ˜t, which is on the
boundary of C. Hence each intermediate solution is always inside C (sometimes called projection free), and
the final outcome θT is the convex combination of up to T points on the boundary of C (or vertices of C
when C is a polytope). Such outcome might be desired, for example when C is a polytope, as it corresponds
to a sparse solution. Due to these reasons Frank-Wolfe algorithm has found many applications in machine
learning [SSSZ10, HK12, Cla10]. As we shall see below, these properties are also useful for obtaining low
risk bounds for their private version.
5.2 Private Frank-Wolfe Algorithm
We now present a private version of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We can achieve privacy by replacing
Line 3 in Algorithm 3 with its private version in one of two ways. In the first variant, we apply exponential
mechanism [MT07] to guarantee privacy; and in the second variant, we apply objective perturbation. The
first variant works especially well when C is a polytope defined by polynomially many vertices. In this
case, we show that the error depends on the `1-Lipschitz constant, which can be much smaller than the
`2-Lipschitz constant. In particular, the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm is nearly optimal for the important
high-dimensional sparse linear regression (or compressive sensing) problem. The second variant applies to
general convex set C. In this case, we are able to show that the risk depends on the Gaussian width of C.
The details are in Appendix B. Algorithm 4 describes the private version of Frank-Wolfe algorithm for the
polytope case, i.e. when C is a convex hull of a finite set S of vertices (or corners). In this case, we know
that any linear function is minimized at one point of S per the following basic fact.
Fact 5.3. Let C ⊆ <p be the convex hull of a compact set S ⊆ <p. For any vector v ∈ <p, arg min
θ∈C
〈θ, v〉 ∩
S 6= ∅.
Since θt+1 can be selected as one of |S| vertices, by applying the exponential mechanism [MT07], we
obtain differentially private algorithm with risk logarithmically dependent on |S|. When |S| is polynomial
in p, it leads to an error bound with log p dependence. While the exponential mechanism can be applied
to the general C as well, its error would depend on the size of a cover of the boundary of C, which can be
exponential in p, leading to an error bound with polynomial dependence on p. Hence for general convex
set C, in ANoise−FW(Gen−convex) (Algorithm 5 in Appendix B) , we use objective perturbation instead and
obtain an error dependent on the Gaussian width of C.
Theorem 5.4 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 4 is (, δ)-differentially private.
The proof of privacy follows from a straight forward use of exponential mechanism [MT07, BLST10]
(the noisy maximum version from [BLST10, Theorem 5]) and the strong composition theorem [DRV10]. In
Theorem 5.5 we prove the utility guarantee for the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm for the convex polytope
case. Define ΓL = max
D∈D
CL over all the possible data sets in D.
Theorem 5.5 (Utility guarantee). LetL1,S and ‖C‖1 be defined as in Algorithms 4 (AlgorithmANoise−FW(polytope)).
Let ΓL be an upper bound on the curvature constant (defined in Definition 5.1) for the loss function L(·; d)
that holds for all d ∈ D. In Algorithm ANoise−FW(polytope), if we set T = ΓL
2/3(n)2/3
(L1‖C‖1)2/3 , then
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
ΓL1/3 (L1‖C‖1)2/3 log(n|S|)
√
log(1/δ)
(n)2/3
)
.
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Algorithm 4 ANoise−FW(polytope): Differentially Private Frank-Wolfe Algorithm (Polytope Case)
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, loss function: L(θ;D) = 1n
n∑
i=1
L(θ; di) (with `1-Lipschitz constant
L1 for `), privacy parameters: (, δ), convex set: C = conv(S) with ‖C‖1 denoting maxs∈S ‖s‖1 and S
being the set of corners.
1: Choose an arbitrary θ1 from C;
2: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
3: ∀s ∈ S, αs ← 〈s,5L(θt;D)〉+ Lap
(
L1‖C‖1
√
8T log(1/δ)
n
)
, where Lap(λ) ∼ 12λe−|x|/λ.
4: θ˜t ← arg min
s∈S
αs.
5: θt+1 ← (1− µ)θt + µθ˜t, where µ = 1T+2 .
6: Output θpriv = θT .
Here the expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.
Proof. For ease of notation we hide the dependence of L on the data set D and represent it simply as
L(θ). In order to prove the utility guarantee we first invoke the utility guarantee of the non-private noisy
Frank-Wolfe algorithm from [Jag13, Theorem 1].
Theorem 5.6 (Non-private utility guarantee [Jag13]). Assume the conditions in Theorem 5.5 and let β > 0
be fixed. Recall that µ = 1/(T + 2) and let φ1 ∈ C. Suppose that 〈s1, · · · , sT 〉 is a sequence of vectors
from C, with φt+1 = (1− µ)φt + µst such that for all t ∈ [T ],
〈st,5L(φt)〉 ≤ min
s∈C
〈s,5L(φt)〉+ 1
2
βµΓL.
Then,
L(φT )−min
θ∈C
L(θ) ≤ 2ΓL
T + 2
(1 + β) .
Since the convex set C is a polytope with corners in S, if st in Theorem 5.6 corresponds to θ˜t in Algo-
rithm ANoise−FW(polytope), and φt corresponds to θt in ANoise−FW(polytope), then using the tail properties of
Laplace distribution and Fact 5.3 one can show that with probability at least 1 − ζ, the term β in Theorem
5.6 is at most O
(
L1‖C‖1
√
8T log(1/δ) log(|S|T/ζ)
µnΓL
)
. Plugging in this bound in Theorem 5.6, we immediately
get that with probability at least 1− ζ,
L(θT )−min
θ∈C
L(θ) = O
(
ΓL
T
+
L1‖C‖1
√
8T log(1/δ) log(|S|T/ζ)
n
)
. (20)
From, (20) we can conclude the following in expectation.
E
[
L(θT )−min
θ∈C
L(θ)
]
= O
(
ΓL
T
+
L1‖C‖1
√
8T log(1/δ) log(TL1‖C‖1 · |S|)
n
)
. (21)
Setting T = ΓL
2/3(n)2/3
(L1‖C‖1)2/3 results in the claimed utility guarantee.
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5.3 Nearly optimal private LASSO
We now apply the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm ANoise−FW(polytope) to the important case of the sparse
linear regression (or LASSO) problem. We show that the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm leads to a nearly
tight O˜( 1
n2/3
) bound.
Problem definition: Given a data set D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} of n-samples from the domain D =
{(x, y) : x ∈ <p, y ∈ [−1, 1], ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1}, and the convex set C = `p1. Define the mean squared loss,
L(θ;D) = 1
2n
∑
i∈[n]
(〈xi, θ〉 − yi)2 . (22)
The objective is to compute θpriv ∈ C to minimize L(θ;D) while preserving privacy with respect to any
change of individual (xi, yi) pair. The non-private setting of the above problem is a variant of the least
squares problem with `1 regularization, which was started by the work of LASSO [Tib96, T+97] and inten-
sively studied in the past years [HTF01, DJ04, CT05, Don06, CT07, BRT09, BM12, RWY09, Zha13].
Since the `1 ball is the convex hull of 2p vertices, we can apply the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm
ANoise−FW(polytope). For the above setting, it is easy to check that the `1-Lipschitz constant is bounded
by O(1). Further, by applying the bound on quadratic programming Remark 5, we have that CL ≤
4 maxθ∈C ‖Xθ‖22 = O(1) since C is the unit `1 ball, and |xij | ≤ 1. Hence Γ = O(1). Now applying
Theorem 5.5, we have
Corollary 5.7. Let D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} of n samples from the domain D = {(x, y) : ‖x‖∞ ≤
1, |y| ≤ 1}, and the convex set C equal to the `1-ball. The output θpriv of Algorithm ANoise−FW(polytope)
ensures the following.
E[L(θpriv;D)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D)] = O
(
log(np/δ)
(n)2/3
)
.
Remark 6. Compared to the previous work [KST12, ST13a], the above upper bound makes no assumption of
restricted strong convexity or mutual incoherence, which might be too strong for realistic settings [Was12].
Also our results significantly improve bounds of [JT14], from O˜(1/n1/3) to O˜(1/n2/3), which considered
the case of the set C being the probability simplex and the loss being a generalized linear model.
In the following, we shall show that to ensure privacy, the error bound in Corollary 5.7 is nearly optimal
in terms of the dominant factor of 1/n2/3.
Theorem 5.8 (Optimality of private Frank-Wolfe). Let C be the `1-ball and L be the mean squared loss in
equation (22). For every sufficiently large n, for every (, δ)-differentially private algorithmA, with  ≤ 0.1
and δ = o(1/n2), there exists a data set D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} of n samples from the domain
D = {(x, y) : ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1, |y| ≤ 1} such that
E[L(A(D);D)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D)] = Ω˜
(
1
n2/3
)
.
We prove the lower bound by following the fingerprinting codes argument of [BUV14] for lowerbound-
ing the error of (, δ)-differentially private algorithms. Similar to [BUV14] and [DTTZ14], we start with
the following lemma which is implicit in [BUV14].The matrix X in Theorem 5.9 is the padded Tardos code
used in [DTTZ14, Section 5]. For any matrix X , denote by X(i) the matrix obtained by removing the i-th
row of X . Call a column of a matrix a concensus column if the entries in the column are either all 1 or all
−1. The sign of a concensus column is simply the concensus value of the column. Write w = m/ logm
and p = 1000m2.
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Theorem 5.9. [Corollary 16 from [DTTZ14], restated] Let m be a sufficiently large positive integer. There
exists a matrix X ∈ {−1, 1}(w+1)×p with the following guarantee. For each i ∈ [1, w + 1], there are at
least 0.999p concensus columns Wi in each X(i). In addition, for algorithm A on input matrix X(i) where
i ∈ [1, w + 1], if with probability at least 2/3, A(X(i)) produces a p-dimensional sign vector which agrees
with at least 34p columns in Wi, then A is not (ε, δ) differentially private with respect to single row change
(to some other row in X).
Write τ = 0.001. Let k = τwp. We first form an k × p matrix Y where the column vectors of Y are
mutually orthogonal {1,−1} vectors. This is possible as k  p. Now we construct w + 1 databases Di for
1 ≤ i ≤ w + 1 as follows. For all the databases, they contain the common set of pair (zj , 0) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
where zj = (Yj1, . . . , Yjp) is the j-th row vector of Y . In addition, each Di contains w pairs (xj , 1) for
xj = (Xj1, . . . , Xjk) for j 6= i. Then L(θ;Di) is defined as follows (for the ease of notation in this proof,
we work with the un-normalized loss. This does not affect the generality of the arguments in any way.)
L(θ;Di) =
∑
j 6=i
(xj · θ − 1)2 +
k∑
j=1
(yj · θ)2 =
∑
j 6=i
(xj · θ − 1)2 + k‖θ‖22 .
The last equality is due to that the columns of Y are mutually orthogonal {−1, 1} vectors. For each
Di, consider θ∗ ∈
{
−1p , 1p
}p
such that the sign of the coordinates of θ∗ matches the sign for the consensus
columns of X(i). Plugging θ∗ in L(θ∗; Dˆ) we have the following,
L(θ∗; Dˆ) ≤
w∑
i=1
(2τ)2 + k/p since the number of consensus columns is at least (1− τ)p]
= (τ + 4τ2)w . (23)
We now prove the crucial lemma, which states that if θ is such that ‖θ‖1 ≤ 1 and L(θ;Di) is small, then
θ has to agree with the sign of concensus columns of X(i).
Lemma 5.10. Suppose that ‖θ‖1 ≤ 1, and L(θ;Di) < 1.1τw. For j ∈ Wi, denote by sj the sign of the
consensus column j. Then we have
|{j ∈Wi : sign(θj) = sj}| ≥ 3
4
p .
Proof. For any S ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, denote by θ|S the projection of θ to the coordinate subset S. Consider three
subsets S1, S2, S3, where
S1 = {j ∈Wi : sign(θj) = sj} ,
S2 = {j ∈Wi : sign(θj) 6= sj} ,
S3 = {1, . . . , p} \Wj .
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that |S1| < 34p.
Further denote θi = θ|Si for i = 1, 2, 3. Now we will bound ‖θ1‖1 and ‖θ3‖1 using the inequality
‖x‖2 ≥ ‖x‖1/
√
d for any d-dimensional vector.
‖θ3‖22 ≥ ‖θ3‖21/|S3| ≥ ‖θ3‖21/(τp) .
Hence k‖θ3‖22 ≥ w‖θ3‖21. But k‖θ3‖22 ≤ k‖θ‖22 ≤ 1.1τw, so that ‖θ3‖1 ≤
√
1.1τ ≤ 0.04.
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Similarly by the assumption of |S1| < 34p,
‖θ1‖22 ≥ ‖θ1‖21/|S1| ≥ 4‖θ1‖21/(3p) .
Again using k‖θ‖22 < 1.1τw, we have that ‖θ1‖1 ≤
√
1.1 ∗ 3/4 ≤ 0.91.
Now we have 〈xi, θ〉 − 1 = ‖θ1‖1 − ‖θ2‖1 + βi − 1 where |βi| ≤ ‖θ3‖1 ≤ 0.04. By ‖θ1‖1 + ‖θ2‖1 +
‖θ3‖1 ≤ 1, we have
|〈xi, θ〉 − 1| ≥ 1− ‖θ1‖ − |βi| ≥ 1− 0.91− 0.04 = 0.05 .
Hence we have that L(θ;Di) ≥ (0.05)2w ≥ 1.1τw. This leads to a contradiction. Hence we must have
|S1| ≥ 34p.
With Theorem 5.9 and Lemma 5.10, we can now prove Theorem 5.8.
Proof. Suppose that A is private. And for the datasets we constructed above,
E[L(A(Di);Di)−min
θ
L(θ;Di)] ≤ cw ,
for sufficiently small constant c. By Markov inequality, we have with probability at least 2/3,L(A(Di);Di)−
minθ L(θ;Di) ≤ 3cw. By (23), we have min
θ
L(θ;Di) ≤ (τ + 4τ2)w. Hence if we choose c a constant
small enough, we have with probability 2/3,
L(A(Di);Di) < (τ + 4τ2 + 3c)w ≤ 1.1τw . (24)
By Lemma 5.10, (24) implies that A(Di) agrees with at least 34p concensus columns in X(i). However by
Theorem 5.9, this violates the privacy of A. Hence we have that there exists i, such that
E[L(A(Di);Di)−min
θ
L(θ;Di)] > cw .
Recall that w = m/ logm and n = w + wp = O(m3/ logm). Hence we have that
E[L(A(Di);Di)−min
θ
L(θ;Di)] = Ω(n1/3/ log2/3 n) .
The proof is completed by converting the above bound to the normalized version of Ω(1/(n log n)2/3).
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A Tighter Guarantees of Mirror Descent for Strongly Convex Functions
In this section we study Algorithm 1 (Algorithm ANoise−MD) in the context of strongly convex functions
with the following form: Every loss function L(θ; d) is L-Lipschitz in the L2-norm and ∆-strongly convex
with respect to some differentiable convex function Ψ : C → <, for any θ ∈ C and d ∈ D. (See Section
2.2 for a definition.) This setting has previously been studied in [DSSST10, SSS07]. Two common example
are: i) Ψ(θ) = 12‖θ‖22 and L(θ; d) is ∆-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖ · ‖2, and ii) for composite loss functions
L(θ; d) = g(θ; d)+∆Ψ(θ) if Ψ(θ) =
p∑
i=1
θi log(θi), thenL(θ; d) is ∆-strongly convex w.r.t. Ψ(θ) within the
probability simplex which is in turn 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖·‖1 [DSSST10, Section 5]. In the following we
show that one can get a much sharper dependence on n (compared to Theorem 3.2) under strong convexity.
Remark 7. [BST14] analyzed the setting of strong convexity w.r.t. `2-norm, and in particular provided tight
error guarantees. For this case, Theorem A.1 leads to similarly tight bounds, and thus the lower bounds
in [BST14] imply that in general, our guarantee cannot be improved.
Theorem A.1 (Utility guarantee for strongly convex functions). Let Q be the symmetric convex hull of C.
Assume that every loss function L(θ; d) is L-Lipschitz in the `2-norm and ∆-strongly convex with respect to
some differentiable 1-strongly convex (w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Q) function Ψ : C → <, for any θ ∈ C and d ∈ D. Let ‖C‖2
be the `2-diameter of the set C, and GC be the Gaussian width. In Algorithm ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1), if
we set T = (‖C‖2·n)
2
(G2C+‖C‖22)
, the potential function to be Ψ and ηt = 2∆t , then following is true.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
L2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
log(n/δ) log(‖C‖2(n))
∆(n)2
)
.
Here the expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.
Proof. For ease of notation, we hide the dependence of L(θ;D) on the data setD, and simply represent it as
L(θ). The first part of the proof is fairly standard and exactly same as that of Theorem 3.2 till (2). Following
the same notation, it suffices to bound 1T
T∑
t=1
L(θt)−min
θ∈C
L(θ). Rest of the proof differs from Theorem 3.2
to the extent that we now work with a quadratic approximation (Claim A.2) to the loss function instead of a
linear application (Claim 3.3).
Claim A.2. Let θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ). For every t ∈ [T ], let γt be the sub-gradient of L(θt;D) used in
iteration t of Algorithm ANoise−MD (Algorithm 1). Then, the following is true.
1
T
T∑
t=1
L (θt;D)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[〈γt, θt − θ∗〉 −∆ · BΨ(θ∗, θt)] .
The proof of this claim is a direct consequence of the definition of strong convexity. Now using (11)
from the proof of Theorem 3.2 and summing over the T iterations, we have the following.
1
T
T∑
t=1
E [〈γt, θt − θ∗〉 −∆ · BΨ(θ∗, θt)] ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[BΨ(θ∗, θt)− BΨ(θ∗, θt+1)
ηt+1
−∆ · BΨ(θ∗, θt)
]
+O
(
L2‖C‖22 + σ2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
T
)
T∑
t=1
ηt+1
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
BΨ(θ∗, θt)
(
1
ηt+1
− 1
ηt
−∆
)]
+O
(
L2‖C‖22 + σ2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
T
)
T∑
t=1
ηt (25)
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Now setting ηt = 1∆·t and using Claim A.2 we obtain the following.
1
T
T∑
t=1
E [L(θt)]− L(θ∗) = O
(
L2‖C‖22 + σ2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
∆T
)
log T
= O
(
log T
∆
(
L2‖C‖22
T
+
L2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
log(n/δ)
(n)2
))
(26)
Setting T = ‖C‖22(n)2/
(
(G2C + ‖C‖22)
)
in (26), we obtain the required excess risk bound as follows:
E
[L(θpriv)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ) = O
(
L2
(
G2C + ‖C‖22
)
log(n/δ) log(‖C‖2(n))
∆(n)2
)
.
B Missing Details for Private Frank-Wolfe for the `2-bounded Case
In this section we provide the details of the private Frank-Wolfe algorithm for the `2-bounded case, along
with the privacy and utility guarantees.
Here for a data setD = {d1, · · · , dn}, define objective function as the empirical loss functionL(θ;D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di). We define L2 the `2-Lipschitz constant, respectively, of L over all the possible data sets.
Algorithm 5 ANoise−FW(Gen−convex): Differentially Private Frank-Wolfe Algorithm (General Convex Case)
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, loss function: L(θ;D) = 1n
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) (with `2-Lipschitz constant
L2 for `), privacy parameters: (, δ), convex set: C bounded in the `2-norm, denoted by ‖C‖2.
1: choose an arbitrary θ1 from C;
2: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
3: θ˜t = arg min
θ∈C
〈5L(θt;D) + bt, θ〉, where bt ∼ N (0, Ipσ2) and σ2 ← 32L2T log
2(n/δ)
(n)2
.
4: θt+1 ← (1− µ)θt + µθ˜t, where µ = 1T+2 .
5: Output θpriv = θT .
Theorem B.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm ANoise−FW(Gen−convex) (Algorithm 5) is (, δ)-differentially
private.
The proof of privacy is exactly same as the proof of privacy in Theorem 3.2. In the following we provide
the utility guarantee for Algorithm ANoise−FW(Gen−convex).
Theorem B.2 (Utility guarantee). LetL2, and ‖C‖2 be defined as in Algorithm 5 (AlgorithmANoise−FW(Gen−convex)).
Let GC the Gaussian width of the convex set C ⊆ <p, and let ΓL be the curvature constant (defined in Def-
inition 5.1) for the loss function `(θ; d) for all θ ∈ C and d ∈ D. In Algorithm ANoise−FW if we set
T = ΓL
2/3(n)2/3
(L2GC)2/3
, then the excess empirical risk is as follows.
E
[L(θpriv;D)]−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) = O
(
ΓL1/3 (L2GC)2/3 log2(n/δ)
(n)2/3
)
.
Here the expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm and ΓL is the curvature constant.
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Proof. Recall σ2 = 32L2T log
2(T/δ)
(n)2
. Using the property of Gaussian width (Section 2.2), and a similar
analysis as that of the convex polytope case, we can conclude the following.
E
[
L(θT )−min
θ∈C
L(θ)
]
= O
(
ΓL
T
+
L2GC
√
T log2(T/δ)
n
)
. (27)
Setting T = ΓL
2/3(n)2/3
(L2GC)2/3
, results in the utility guarantee.
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